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“Those who governed well did not arm, those who were armed well did not
set up battle lines, those who set up battle lines well did not fight, those
who fought well did not lose, those who lost well did not perish.”
— Zhuge Liang, 3d century

T

he parliamentary elections in Afghanistan were the final event of the
internationally-sponsored Bonn Accords of December 2001. During the
past four years, Afghanistan has made significant progress toward democracy while reconstructing the country’s political, social, and security institutions. These include adopting an enlightened constitution (January 2004),
holding a successful presidential election (October 2004) and parliamentary
elections (September 2005), while creating a national army and a national police force, dismantling major factional militia units, building a national economy from ground zero, expanding and improving a formal education system,
and improving the status and future of Afghan women.
Although Afghanistan met all the deadlines of the Bonn Accord, it
has not realized the treaty’s ultimate goal of ending the conflict and establishing peace and stability. Roadblocks have included the extent of war damage
and a lack of sufficient investment in developing state institutions and the
economy. The progress is dramatic but fragile, and it could be lost if the momentum is not sustained.
Afghanistan is again at a crossroads. One road leads to peace and
prosperity; the other leads to the loss of all that has been achieved. Everything
depends on the level of international commitment to help Afghanistan emerge
from the dark shadows of the instability and violence of its recent past. Lost opportunities and failure to respond to challenges are unfortunately the hallmarks
of Afghanistan’s turbulent history. In the last decade, the failure of Mujahedin
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groups to unite in building a democratic government following the end of Soviet occupation plunged the country into a bloody civil war, and the US abandonment of its wartime allies left a war-devastated Afghanistan to fall victim to
the political schemes of its neighbors.
This article looks at the challenges and opportunities that face Afghanistan in the post-Bonn period. Specifically it focuses on ways of fostering
the long-term development of governance, security, and economic growth in
the country.

Governance
Establishment of good governance is essential for fostering the development of security and economic recovery. In reaction to Afghanistan’s
prolonged insecurity, warlordism, and factional infighting, there is a widespread Afghan public desire for a strong central government that can provide
security in the chaotic post-conflict environment and offer needed services to
war-devastated communities. In order for the central government to meet
such public expectations, it needs to strengthen its control of rural areas and
deliver required services.
While the central government has extensive constitutional authority
over the provinces, Kabul’s limited ability to intervene and its accommodation of local power brokers have left factional chiefs in control of local government. The situation is a reflection of the country’s immediate past, where
the breakdown of central government power led to the emergence of local
leaders or warlords who wielded power and set up patronage networks
through access to foreign aid, weapons, tax revenue, natural resources, and
the illicit narcotics trade. The significant reliance of US-led Coalition forces
on the factional militia to defeat the Taliban in 2001 and to conduct stability
operations led to the empowerment of factional commanders while contributing to the fragmentation of power and frustrating the reform process.

Ali Ahmad Jalali was the Interior Minister of Afghanistan from January 2003 to September 2005. He is now a Distinguished Professor at the Near East South Asia Center for
Strategic Studies of the National Defense University. He previously served with the Voice
of America for over 20 years covering Afghanistan, South and Central Asia, and the Middle East, including assignments as Director of the Afghan Radio Network Project and chief
of the Pashto, Dari, and Farsi (Persian) services. He is a former colonel in the Afghan army
and was a top military planner with the Afghan resistance following the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan. He attended higher command and staff colleges in Afghanistan, the United
States, Britain, and Russia, and has lectured widely. Mr. Jalali is the author of several
books, including a three-volume military history of Afghanistan. His most recent book,
The Other Side of the Mountain (2002), coauthored with Lester Grau, is an analytical review of the Mujahedin war with the Soviet forces in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989.
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Over the past two years, Kabul has successfully reduced the power
of warlord-governors by reassigning them away from their geographic power
base,1 but their networks continue to influence provincial administration.
Meanwhile, former factional commanders who are appointed to government
positions in police and civil administration have loaded their offices with
their unqualified supporters and corrupt cronies.
With a major presence in Iraq and only a secondary presence in Afghanistan, the United States has long hesitated to support the removal of
defiant warlords. Further, despite the wide public support for the national
government, Kabul has been reluctant to act decisively. The bulk of the
9,000-member, NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is
based in Kabul. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)2 deployed by
ISAF in the northern and western provinces of Afghanistan have been hamstrung by the policy constraints of troop-contributing nations, resource limitations, and “national caveats” to act decisively against local thugs, drugs,
and official mugs. While the PRTs are mandated to help extend the authority
of the central government and facilitate stability, in certain cases they have
discouraged government action against spoilers because of concerns about
their own security.
Given the limited coercive capacity of the central government, the
Afghan leadership and donor countries found it tactically convenient to integrate the demobilized militia leaders and former warlords into the government.
However, failure to hold them accountable and to correct their inappropriate
official behavior continues to undermine the establishment of the rule of law.
This not only thwarts the legitimacy of the national government but also fosters
corruption and a sense of impunity. Unless the government lives up to public
expectations for providing security and services, local patronage networks will
not only survive but will also use their power to influence national programs
and the reform agenda. Government and foreign toleration of regional bullies
in the hope of maintaining stability takes a heavy toll on local security.
The recent parliamentary elections, held on a non-party basis, led to
the emergence of a politically fragmented legislature. The positive aspect is
that this provides the opportunity for members of different political, ethnic,
and regional interest groups to wage their political fight peacefully in the parliament house rather than on battlefields. However, the absence of organized
political blocs makes the new parliament a wild card with a potential to either
strengthen or weaken the political process in Afghanistan. Lawmakers’ support of national programs will add legitimacy to the process, while their emphasis on parochial and populist themes could impede government decisions
on reform and put President Karzai at odds with the diverging interests of Afghanistan’s international partners. Much depends on the nature of emerging
6
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“Afghanistan is again at a crossroads. One road
leads to peace and prosperity; the other leads
to the loss of all that has been achieved.”

political caucuses and the effectiveness of mechanisms set to enhance understanding and cooperation between the executive and legislative branches.
The long-term solution is building a functioning state able to monopolize the use of legitimate means of coercion and which has the capacity
to respond to the people’s political, social, and economic needs. Unless donors direct their military, political, and financial assistance toward this goal,
the situation will not change fast. Working through different actors without a
unified strategy, as was the case during the past four years, will not work. Democracy cannot develop in a weak state.

Security
Security continues to be a prerequisite for political development and
economic growth. Security cannot be achieved only by securing the state, but
also requires removing the threats faced by the vast majority of Afghan citizens. An international focus on fighting terrorism should not overshadow the
threats emanating from militia commanders, drug traffickers, corrupt provincial and district administrators, and government incompetence. Such threats
are often more damaging to the population than terrorist violence.
Security in a post-conflict society finds its meaning in the notion of
“human security,” which assures the sustainability of the peaceful environment. It requires opportunities more than policies and promises. The long
period of war and violence has added a dimension of conflict memory to
perceptions of security. Under such perceptions people tend to act more
warily, and thus slowly, in investing their hope in long-term government projects aimed at peace and prosperity. This affects many post-conflict issues, including disarmament, factionalism, warlordism, and the illicit drug trade.
Freedom from fear and freedom from want lead to human security, and they
require more than building the state security forces. They entail the development of good governance, social security, economic development, and the
protection of the human and political rights of the citizens.
The diversity of the security challenges in Afghanistan means that
only an integrated and holistic approach to the establishment of the rule of
Spring 2006
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law can ensure the achievement of peace and security. Uncoordinated progress in one area of the rule of law cannot produce a significant advancement in
other areas. Rather, it undermines security and stability.

Security Threats
The Taliban-led insurgency, particularly in the south and east, the
presence of illegal armed groups, and the illicit drug trade are the main security
threats in Afghanistan. The Taliban and their extremist allies lack a unified
leadership, a popular ideology for Afghanistan, and a sustainable logistics support network inside the country. A recent ABC News survey in Afghanistan indicates that 77 percent of Afghans believe their country is heading in the right
direction. Despite the prevalent economic difficulty and poverty they face, 91
percent prefer the current Afghan government to the Taliban regime, and 87
percent call the US-led overthrow of the Taliban good for their country.3
The Taliban-led extremist violence in Afghanistan is more grounded
in political roots than ideological. Using the “jehadi” current as a cover, foreign circles and domestic spoilers pay or manipulate operatives to commit acts
of violence in support of their political agenda. The Taliban have training
camps, staging areas, recruiting centers (madrassas), and safe havens in Pakistan. The operations of a 70,000-strong Pakistani military force, deployed in
the border region, mostly in the Waziristan tribal area, have been effective
against al Qaeda and non-Pakistani militants, but they have not done much toward containing the Taliban. This means that more effort is needed to stop
cross-border terrorist activity in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s idea of constructing a
fence along the border is neither practical nor politically desirable, however.4
As long as the Taliban continue to use Pakistani territory for attacks on Afghanistan, the suspicion that Pakistan is playing a double game in Afghanistan
will persist. Invigorating the Tri-Partite US-Afghan-Pakistani Commission on
fighting terrorism and close operational cooperation between Afghanistan and
Pakistan are essential to ending the insurgency.
The escalated level of militant violence in 2005 is more indicative of
a change in tactics than capability. Instead of attacks by larger groups, the
militants now mostly use smaller teams to attack soft targets and convoys.
The suicide attacks, which are traditionally alien to Afghans, and the moresophisticated IED (improvised explosive device) technology are al Qaeda efforts. The initiation of the national reconciliation drive, attempts by al Qaeda
to undermine the image of Afghanistan as a success story, increased support
of al Qaeda and regional extremist groups by insurgents, closer cooperation
between the militants and drug-traffickers (particularly in Helmand Province), and more active military actions taken by the Coalition and Afghan
forces against the insurgents have contributed to the escalation. An estimated
8
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1,500 people were killed in militant-related violence in 2005, but the rebels
constituted 60 to 70 percent of the dead.
While the insurgency and illegal armed groups do not yet have the
capacity to pose strategic threats to the government, they create a sense of insecurity, hinder economic reconstruction, and weaken government influence
in remote areas. This may eventually lead to a much stronger insurgency capable of challenging the government. In many districts, the resurgence of
Taliban violence is caused more by the lack of government presence than the
ability of the insurgents.
Fighting insurgency requires more than military action. Simply fighting insurgents will never fully eradicate them, for even in their defeat a vacuum
will remain, inexorably attracting new insurgents. Unless the context that
nourishes the continuing violence—such as the desperate economic conditions, the lack of governmental capacity, repression of communities by local
thugs, and foreign interference—is addressed with the same singleness of purpose as is the military strategy, Afghanistan will remain a volatile place, menacing international security as well as its own. What Afghanistan needs is a
holistic approach, integrating law enforcement, good governance, economic
opportunity, and firm diplomacy with necessary residual combat operations.

Security Sector Reform
Security Sector Reform (SSR) has been the flagship of the Bonn Process for rebuilding Afghanistan’s security forces and law enforcement. With
each of its five pillars (army; police; counter-narcotics; Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration [DDR]; and justice) supported by a lead donor
nation, Security Sector Reform has developed unevenly.
Progress in building the US-supported Afghan National Army (ANA)
has been remarkable. ANA’s strength has reached nearly 27,000, and it is expected to attain its goal of 70,000 in two years. However, the ANA suffers from
insufficient combat power, the lack of indigenous air support, and the absence
of a self-sustaining operational budget. Therefore, it continues to depend on
military support from the Coalition forces and US underwriting for its costs.
Although building the police in post-conflict societies is a more urgent need than the army, little international attention has been paid to the development of the Afghan National Police (ANP). And yet the police have
been at the forefront of fighting terrorism, illegal border incursions, the illicit
drug trade, warlords, and organized crime. Protecting reconstruction projects, including highways in the militant-plagued south, is another major
challenge facing the ANP. As a result, the ANP has lost far more men than the
ANA, Coalition forces, and ISAF in fighting insurgency and criminal activity
across the country during the past four years. Had the police been better
Spring 2006
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trained, equipped, and armed, they would have suffered less and made greater
contributions to stability operations.
International interest and investment in developing the ANP picked
up a year ago with Germany and the United States in leading roles that brought
significant initial results. Over 55,000 police officers have received basic training so far. But because of the late start in comprehensive police development,
the ANP continues to be ill-trained, poorly paid, underequipped, and inadequately armed. A new US-supported ANP development program that was
launched in 2005 aims to deploy a 62,000-strong, fully trained, better-paid, and
fully equipped police force by December 2008. Implementation of the program
should be a top priority of the post-Bonn development strategy.
Although the Japan-supported Disarmament, Demobilization, and
Reintegration (DDR) program succeeded in demobilizing more than 62,000
factional militiamen, collecting some 36,000 small arms, and storing nearly all
militia heavy weapons, reintegrating former combatants continues to be a formidable task. Further, the second phase of the DDR, which targets nearly 2,000
illegal armed groups, has just begun under the Disbanding Illegal Armed
Group (DIAG) program. This program seeks voluntary, negotiated, and forced
disbanding of more than 100,000 members of the illegal armed groups. DIAG
is going to be a difficult goal to achieve during the post-Bonn process.
The Italian-supported justice sector reform suffers from a very low
level of human resources and infrastructure capacity. The Afghan court structure is outdated, many judicial personnel are unqualified, and corruption is
deep-rooted. The period of violence in the country has destroyed the institutional integrity of the justice system and left a patchwork of contradictory and
overlapping laws. Although some progress has been made, particularly in law
reform, no strategy has been agreed upon for rebuilding the justice system.
While these five pillars are interconnected, the “lead nation” approach has been marked by a lack of close coordination, an imbalance in the
level of committed resources, and the absence of a unified developmental
concept. The post-Bonn strategy should ensure more Afghan ownership,
making the Afghan government the “lead nation” with the donor countries
acting as “supporting nations” for Security Sector Reform.
Given that foreign aid pays most of the cost of the security forces, the
long-term sustainability of the army and police is a major challenge. Even if
the country’s non-drug taxable economy grows by ten percent a year above
the current rate, the cost of maintaining the security forces is not going to be
sustainable from the country’s own resources for many years.5 Indeed, a decline in foreign funding could lead to extraordinary political, security, and social crises. Given the prohibitive cost of maintaining professional forces,
there is strong support in Afghanistan for restoration of the national draft sys10
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tem, which presumably would also promote national integration and civic education. However, the feasibility of such a change depends on the level of the
central government’s country-wide control.

Coalition Forces and ISAF
With limited current national security capacity, Afghanistan continues to need an international military presence for fighting insurgency and protecting the reconstruction effort until Afghan security institutions can become
effective and sustainable. In addition to their operational power, the presence
of 20,000 US-led Coalition forces and 9,000 International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) personnel deters security threats posed by internal and external
spoiler forces. The plans to boost NATO-led ISAF forces in 2006 signify wider
international support and legitimacy of state-building in Afghanistan. But a
commensurate reduction of the US forces as a result is unfortunate. The announced reduction of 2,500 US troops in 2006 is seen in Afghanistan as more
of a psychological concern than an operational drawdown. For many Afghans,
it causes them to harken back to the end of the Cold War, when the United
States walked away from a devastated Afghanistan, leaving the country to descend into a brutal civil war. There is a concern that the reduction could embolden the insurgents and prompt some regional countries to interfere.
Although US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has stated that the
American military would “continue to do the heavy lifting” in Afghanistan,6
the operational impact of the shift to ISAF depends on the nature of the expanded NATO mission in Afghanistan and its rules of engagement. There is a
certain level of disagreement among NATO members that shackles them with
constraining rules of engagement. The revised Operational Plan adopted by
NATO Foreign Ministers on 8 December 2005 focuses mostly on peacekeeping security operations in coordination with the Afghan security forces. The
rules of engagement do not provide for taking military action against drug production, processing, and trafficking. Although the new plan provides for an increase of 6,000 personnel (bringing the total to 15,000) and the establishment
of four Regional Commands and a Forward Support Base in Kandahar,7 it
leaves the counterterrorism mission to the US-led Coalition. In NATO’s southern area of operations, criminal activities are intertwined with insurgent activity. Separation of terrorism from other security threats—such as drug-related
crimes, warlordism, and general crime—is not always possible.
The absence of joint mechanisms to plan and coordinate the actions
of national and international forces in fighting security threats is a significant
hurdle in bringing synergy to stability operations. There is little connection
between operations separately planned by the US-led Coalition, ISAF, and
the Afghan security forces. The situation weakens effectiveness and effiSpring 2006
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ciency and leads to confusion and unintended collateral damage. The establishment of a joint Command and Control Center to plan, conduct, and
coordinate joint operations is of prime importance.

Counter-narcotics
The problem of drugs in Afghanistan is generally considered the single most challenging factor to the long-term security and development of the
country. Afghanistan has a relatively short history of opium production.
Emerging as part of the war economy in the 1980s, opium production soared
in the past decade. The country now produces nearly 90 percent of the world’s
opium. Opium revenue accounts for 52 percent of Afghanistan’s licit gross
domestic product (GDP)8 and constitutes about 30 percent of the total GDP.9
But only about one percent of the Afghan drug sale on the international market goes to the Afghan poppy farmers, and less than ten percent to Afghan
traffickers and traders.10 The other 90 percent goes to traders and distributors
outside Afghanistan. So opium is not only an Afghan problem, but also a
problem of regional and global dimensions. Fighting narcotics requires a
joint national and international effort.
The most recent United Nations survey reports some progress in
fighting poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. It indicates a 21 percent decrease
in cultivation and a 2.4 percent decline in opium production. However, the
country still produced 4,100 tons of opium in 2005.11
The essential element of the Afghan counter-narcotics strategy is
an eight-pillar, counter-narcotics implementation plan that is based on a
comprehensive, long-term, and sustainable approach toward the elimination of production, consumption, and trafficking of narcotics within and
from Afghanistan. The main components of the plan include law enforcement, eradication, promoting alternative livelihoods, criminal justice, and
regional cooperation.
However, there is considerable disagreement among the national and
international partners about strategic approaches and target priorities. The
main issue is who to target first. Is it producers and farmers, or processors and
traders? The farmers receive less than 20 percent of the drug revenue in Afghanistan. The rest goes to a nexus of traders, traffickers, illegal militia commanders, and corrupt government officials. Therefore targeting the nexus can
have a much greater impact on the enterprise. There are two groups of people
involved in the drug business: those who do it out of need (farmers) and those
who are doing it out of greed. It so happens that the greedy ones often force the
needy ones to produce opium by offering them cash credits, leasing their lands,
and using coercive methods. In 2005, farmers’ income from opium poppies
was $5,400 (US) per hectare compared with about $550 per hectare for wheat.12
12
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“Freedom from fear and freedom from want lead
to human security, and they require more
than building the state security forces.”

The Afghan government counter-narcotics program aims at developing the capacity to conduct targeted and verifiable eradication of 20,000 hectares or 15 percent of total poppy cultivation per year down to an overall crop of
10,000 hectares by 2013. Of the 21 percent decrease in poppy cultivation in
2005, only a five percent reduction was made through eradication; the rest was
achieved through persuasion and offering alternative livelihoods in three major poppy-growing provinces (Nangrahar, Helmand, and Badakhshan). Afghanistan has also created a limited interdiction capacity. During the past year
the Afghan counter-narcotics police have destroyed about 180 heroin laboratories and 200 tons of narcotics—but that still represents less than five percent of
opium production.
The lessons learned during the past four years suggest that targeting
traffickers and traders has fewer negative effects and does not require providing alternative livelihoods. However, the interdiction capacity is limited, and
the criminal justice sector responsible for processing drug-related crime is not
up to the challenge. While interim arrangements to expedite the judicial process are taken, the involvement of international forces is needed to enhance the
interdiction capacity. ISAF has shown a reluctance to get involved in the drug
war. But as a security assistance force it should play a role in counter-narcotics
operations that are security-related. ISAF’s role in targeting drug laboratories,
opium stockpiles, and trafficking routes not only helps Afghan counternarcotics efforts but also curtails the flow of drugs to Europe, which gets 90
percent of its heroin from Afghanistan.
The illicit drug trade is a low-risk activity in a high-risk environment.
In order to eliminate it, the situation needs to be reversed: the illicit drug trade
must be made a high-risk activity in a low-risk environment. This entails the
development of human security and firm establishment of the rule of law.
Eradication without providing for meaningful alternative livelihoods
is not sustainable. Reduction of poppy cultivation takes more than a forcible
eradication program. Eradication does not hold promise as a near-term solution, and forcible eradication can be counterproductive. Poverty and eradication have to be attacked simultaneously. Elimination of poppy cultivation
Spring 2006
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should be sought through developmental approaches. The development of alternative livelihoods is a key to achieving long-term counter-narcotics goals.
However, the effort should aim at broader development targets that include
building effective governance, supporting a strong civil society, and creating a
social protection system. Creating alternative livelihoods must be linked to
sustainable economic recovery. Focusing solely on alternative livelihoods in
drug-producing areas is a shorter-term tactical response to the problem. Alternative livelihoods should be considered as the goal rather than the means.
Given the multi-dimensional nature of opium production in Afghanistan, counter-narcotics efforts should be mainstreamed into all aspects of development: security, economic growth, and governance. There are no quick
and simple solutions. Destroying one third of Afghanistan’s economy without
undermining stability requires enormous resources, administrative capacity,
and time. Attempts to simplify the problem—in order to make it manageable
and appealing to the domestic policies of the donor countries—do not lead to
sustained progress. A counter-narcotics strategy should not narrowly focus on
law enforcement, but address all other related aspects including security, governance, and development. Only a comprehensive, holistic approach to resolving the problem will succeed.

Development
Over the past four years, Afghanistan has made remarkable progress
in laying the basis for the country’s recovery. But in spite of its significant
economic growth, the country’s recovery is fragile and it cannot be sustained
without prolonged international assistance. Available estimates suggest that
by March 2006, the Afghan economy will have grown by more than 80 percent since 2001.13 Much of the progress is attributed to foreign assistance and
the illegal drug economy that amounted to 52 percent of licit GDP in 2005.14
Afghanistan’s development index is among the lowest in the world. The majority of Afghanistan’s population suffers from a multidimensional poverty
that includes inadequate access to productive assets, social services, health
services, and education.15 The illiteracy rate is about 80 percent, and life expectancy is under 45.16
The challenge of economic development in Afghanistan is a challenge of state-building where economic development is closely linked to security and political reform. Recovery hinges on the establishment of the rule
of law and effective governance. Lack of progress in one area hinders recovery in other sectors.
The government’s newly adopted Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy (I-ANDS) is its overarching strategy for promoting
growth, generating wealth, and reducing poverty and vulnerability. The strat14
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egy has been worked out after careful consultation with representatives at all
levels of the government, the private sector, nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), civil society, and the international community. The I-ANDS is a
comprehensive development approach to building infrastructure, managing
natural resources, agriculture and rural development, human capital and gender equality, social protection, economic governance and private sector development, international and regional cooperation, good civil governance,
the rule of law, and security.
The international commitment to post-Bonn development in Afghanistan needs to focus on supporting the National Development Strategy over the
next five years. The key challenge facing reconstruction and development in
Afghanistan is the poverty that affects both governance and security. Implementation of I-ANDS is the key to reducing poverty, since a “pro-poor” growth
framework constitutes the foundation of the I-ANDS.
Eradication of extreme poverty is also the first goal of the country’s
recently adopted Millennium Development Goals (MDG).17 The country needs
a secure environment and sustained growth over at least the next ten years to reduce poverty significantly by 2020. The MDG plan envisages that this growth
would have to actively favor the poor by building their productive assets. Much
of it is expected to come from non-poppy agriculture that contributes about half
of the licit GDP and provides employment to two-thirds of the workforce. The
plan envisions that investment in rural roads, power, and water will increase
access to markets and provide impetus to the rural economy, reducing hunger
and malnutrition. A massive rural public works program to build a reliable
rural road system and expand irrigation will help generate rural employment
and wages, connect the rural population to the market, and create the necessary
conditions for poverty reduction. Achievement of these goals requires extensive, predictable, and sustained international aid.
The Afghan government also needs to widen its revenue base,
through raising taxes and collecting state revenues, to support institutionbuilding and to meet the public demand for basic services. Afghanistan has
almost the lowest rate of revenue to GDP in the world. Government revenue
amounts to only four percent of the GDP,18 while the rate for most developing
countries is ten percent and for developed nations is over 30 percent. The
Afghan government is critically dependent on international funding for recurring costs. Recent World Bank studies indicate that Afghanistan’s domestic revenue will not be sufficient to cover the government’s operating costs
for the next five to seven years.19 The country will need to secure guarantees
from donor countries for predictable funding for the next five years in exchange for taking concrete measures to meet revenue targets. In 2004 the
Afghan government estimated that the amount of aid required for minimal
Spring 2006
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stabilization would be $27.5 billion over a period of seven years.20 The longterm receipt of such a significant level of foreign aid is highly uncertain, and
it depends heavily on the perceptions of the international community about
the costs of Afghanistan’s failure. It also hinges on Afghanistan’s progress in
political, economic, security, and administrative reform.
During the Bonn Process, most of the aid money was allocated to entities outside government control. According to UN and Afghan government
data, out of $8.4 billion in aid money spent in Afghanistan between the fall of
the Taliban in late 2001 and the end of 2004, only $1.6 billion was spent by the
government. The rest was spent by NGOs, the United Nations, or by donor
governments.21 This off-budget assistance hinders state-building and undermines government legitimacy. Although a recent UN General Assembly resolution on Afghanistan endorses the leadership role of Afghanistan in the
post-Bonn reconstruction process,22 the world body has indicated that giving
the Afghan government direct control over funds provided by the international community hinges on the development of Afghan government structures—and that will take time. So, this will be a gradual process.23 What is
important, however, is that funds are disbursed in accordance with the priorities of the Afghan government, and that more transparency is brought to all
levels of international aid.
Fifty-seven percent of the Afghanistan population is under 18 years
of age with little opportunity for employment. When construction projects
boom, there is a shortage of skilled indigenous labor. Part of this labor is currently provided by tens of thousands of foreign workers (mostly Pakistanis
and Iranians). India has pledged to provide vocational training for thousand
of Afghans, but the creation of massive job opportunities will require more
than that. No meaningful growth can be achieved without a substantial investment in human capital development. Capacity-building in both the private
and the public sector will be essential for the emergence of an effective civil
service and a thriving private sector.
The development of Afghanistan’s private sector is not only a key
to its economic growth but also a prerequisite for its active involvement in
inter-regional trade. A recent survey indicates that Afghan firms perform
better than comparable firms in neighboring Central Asian countries, but they
lag in productivity behind Pakistan, India, and China.24 Although new laws on
investment, taxation of income, and customs reforms have liberalized the
business environment, a shortage of electricity, access to land, corruption, security, trade regulation, taxation, and other infrastructure drawbacks are serious impediments. While there are no quick and simple solutions to these
problems, removing the hurdles that deter domestic entrepreneurs and foreign investors should be given top priority.
16
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Finally, fighting corruption is a major challenge facing the developmental process in Afghanistan. According to the 2005 annual survey by the
Berlin-based organization Transparency International, Afghanistan ranks
117th in terms of the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), among 159 countries surveyed. Although Afghanistan is considered less corrupt than most of
its neighbors (including Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and
Russia) and 38 other countries, corruption remains a major obstacle in the
way of reform and development. There is no simple and quick answer to this
problem. But making the right decisions on fighting poverty, offering better
salaries to law enforcement officers and the civil service, and adopting a
zero-tolerance approach for corrupt government officials can contribute to
achieving long-term anti-corruption goals.

Regional Dynamics
Afghanistan has long suffered from interference by neighboring and
regional states. Despite the presence of international military forces in Afghanistan and the stated commitment of the United States, United Kingdom,
and NATO to uphold the independence, territorial integrity, and sovereignty
of Afghanistan, the country is still vulnerable to those neighbors’ influence,
and that has the potential to either spoil or promote Afghanistan’s development. Promoting cooperation with neighbors and regional states in areas of
common interest will go a long way toward increasing the stability, peace,
and prosperity of war-devastated Afghanistan. One way to achieve this is the
development of regional trade and cultural ties between the Central and South
Asian countries, where Afghanistan can serve as a geographic bridge. The development of productive relations serves the common interests of the people
in the region, contributes to confidence-building, addresses long-standing
political issues, and eases tensions.
Although disadvantaged by its landlocked nature, Afghanistan has
traditionally capitalized on its geographic location. Historically a trading nation with a strong private sector, Afghanistan has long served as a trade and
transit bridge between three main geographic regions: Central Asia, South
Asia, and the Middle East. The extension of inter-regional economic ties can
revive Afghanistan’s historical role, contributing to its economic recovery. Afghanistan’s recent inclusion in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)25 and the adoption of the “Kabul Declaration” on regional
cooperation at a 12-nation26 conference in Kabul in early December 2005 can
facilitate the resurgence of Afghanistan as the hub of inter-regional economic
exchange. A number of supporting projects are under way or agreed-upon, including the construction of the southwest Zaranj-Dilaram highway in Afghanistan that connects the country to the Chahbahar port of Iran, and a multilateral
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agreement in 2004 between Afghanistan, Iran, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan on
building transit routes connecting Central Asia with the Middle East through
Afghanistan. Constructing a projected gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Pakistan through Afghanistan is another potential opportunity.
Transnational cooperation is influenced by geopolitical conditions,
however. The benefits and costs of cooperation are not the same for all related
countries. Finding a common denominator, such as building intra-regional
transport routes, is the starting point.

Conclusion
At the end of the Bonn Process, Afghanistan finds itself at a crossroads. Continued international security and economic assistance, for at least
ten more years, and sustained domestic leadership for reform will enable the
country to build on achievements made during the past four years, and enable
it to become a success story in the region. The other option is for the country
to slide back into the difficult past of instability and tension. Given the potentially devastating impact of a failed Afghan state in a globalizing world, leaving Afghanistan can no longer be an option.
The key to the development of democracy and prosperity in Afghanistan is building a viable and capable state and a robust economy. The Bonn Process was dominated by an international agenda for security following the
overthrow of the Taliban regime and their al Qaeda allies. The post-Bonn process needs to be based on an Afghan agenda for long-term development as a
key to sustained peace and stability. The Bonn Process required Afghanistan to
meet certain benchmarks toward democratic development. The succeeding
process should identify how the international community can support the implementation of an Afghan development strategy over the next five years. The
result should be a compact between the international community and the
Afghan government on their joint effort to achieve a clearly defined end-state.
This compact needs to be institutionalized in an overarching strategic
plan based on a shared vision around which different activities are coordinated,
prioritized, sequenced, and resourced. Such a plan should ensure that different
actions support identified programs, requiring each action to be assessed in relation to the overall objectives. In this manner Afghanistan and the international community can continue the remarkable progress that has been achieved
in the past four years, benefiting engaged nations and the Afghan people alike.
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Kandahar (2004), Haji Din Mohammad of Nangrahar (2005), Gul Ahmad of Badghis (2003), Mohammad
Ibrahim of Ghor (2004), Sher Mohammad Akondzada of Helmand (2005), Syed Amin of Badakhshan (2003).
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